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Abstract: Health controversies involve the now-familiar complexities of polylogue: multiple positions, multiple 
players, and multiple places. A vexing issue that cuts across many health topics is what counts as evidence. Several 
different expert fields may each try to enforce their own evidence standards, and lay participants (whose well-being 
depends on any expert consensus that may form) often bring their own distinctive forms of evidence. This presentation 
examines  disagreements over evidence within a series of case studies. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The term controversy is commonly used to refer to sustained differences of views in which 
various actors see difference of opinion as an obstacle or a threat to their own goals. 
Controversies always involve disagreement, but to be recognizable as a controversy, the 
disagreement must be sustained and (more importantly) consequential for at least a subset of 
actors. As Venturini (2010, p. 261) puts this, controversies “begin when actors discover that they 
cannot ignore each other and controversies end when actors manage to work out a solid 
compromise to live together.” Controversies can die down (at least temporarily) even if 
important disagreements have not been resolved, so long as  some arrangement makes it possible 
for all parties to ignore the disagreements and go on with their individual business. But 
unresolved disagreements can always bubble up again, or new disagreements can appear, 
bringing the controversy back to life. 
 Controversies give rise to arguments that may be simple at first but that become more 
complex as the participants elaborate their positions in response to all other positions that affect 
their own goals. Often, exactly what is controversial shifts over time, turning what seemed to be 
a controversy over one easily specified issue into a controversy over something quite different. 
These sequentially unfolding displays of reasoning are especially interesting objects for building 
argumentation theory not only because they generate many, many individual arguments but also 
because they so often put argumentation’s natural normativity on display, as participants seek to 
enforce one or another conception of reasonableness on other participants (Jackson, 2019).  
My particular focus in this essay will be health controversies. A health controversy is a 
sustained set of disagreements about some practical choice to be made regarding human health. 
Divergent views on these choices cannot simply be tolerated, because the choices to be made 
have practical consequences. Health controversies generally develop into polylogues (Aakhus & 
Lewiński, 2017), involving multiple players, multiple positions the players may advance, and 
multiple places where one position can come into conflict with another. These controversies 
often involve two or three different expert communities as players, along with policy-makers, 
policy-implementers, and ordinary people whose lives and well-being may depend on how 
component issues get resolved.  
Various kinds of evidence (notably, scientific evidence concerning effects of medical 
treatments, factual claims extracted from public health data, and firsthand personal experience of 
patients) are obviously central to these controversies. Players with disparate interests and 
background may also bring disparate standards of evidence, and surprisingly often, health 
controversies involve serious and sustained disagreements over evidence. Except within 
homogeneous communities, no sort of evidence has automatic acceptability when offered as a 
premise in an argument. Disagreements over evidence, though quite common in health 
controversies, are often among the most frustrating to the participants themselves, who may find 
challenges to their own evidence as manifestly unreasonable. Generalizing across controversies I 
have studied in the past, I observe that disagreements over evidence can easily flow into 
argumentative dead ends (as when one side or another refuses to respond to criticism), but it is 
also possible for disagreements over evidence to create real opportunities for lasting resolutions 
of controversy. 
In health controversies I have studied, arguments over evidence are extremely 
heterogeneous. They include (1) what to count as evidence or to deprecate as “non-evidence”; 
(2) what acknowledged evidence is evidence for; (3) how to resolve contradictions between one 
bit of evidence and another; (4) how new evidence may be generated; and (5) given that the 
generation of new evidence may be possible for only a subset of players, who should decide what 
evidence to generate. Materials selected for this essay come from three controversies: a very 
long-simmering and globally significant public resistance to vaccination (Jackson, 2015; Jackson 
& Lambert, 2016), a brief wave of public protest over AIDS drug trials in the 1980s (Brashers & 
Jackson, 1991), and a lingering debate over what should be taught in school sex education 
programs in the US (Jackson, 2007, 2008b). All of these have attracted notice from many other 
scholars, but in this essay, most of the data and prior analysis comes from my own studies. 
For each case study, I begin with brief descriptions of the controversy, describing the 
circumstances giving rise to the controversy and the specific issues that involve disagreement 
over evidence. Then, key materials captured from the controversy are discussed in detail, and 
lessons from the case are briefly presented. 
 
2. MMR vaccination controversy 
 
Vaccination of very small children with the measles-mumps-rubella vaccine has been 
contentious for almost half-a-century. The practical question at the heart of this controversy is 
different for different players. For parents, the central question is whether they should have their 
children vaccinated. For policy-makers (including those responsible for public schooling), the 
central question is whether vaccination should be a requirement for attending school. For 
medical scientists, the central question is whether the MMR vaccine is safe and effective. For 
public health officials, the central question is how to achieve “herd immunity,” with a 
subordinate question being what proportion of the population must be immunized in order to 
prevent epidemics of these diseases. There are other questions, too, such as who is responsible 
for vaccine injuries, that involve the pharmaceutical industry and other interests. 
A common mistake in thinking about the controversy is to reduce it to a single question: 
does the MMR vaccine cause autism in previously healthy children? While this is one issue that 
continually surfaces in the controversy, it is not actually very central. People on the pro-
vaccination side are far more likely to bring up this topic than are people on the anti-vaccination 
side, with the result that too little attention is paid to people’s actual arguments against 
vaccinating their children. The range of beliefs people actually have about vaccination—the 
reasons they may refuse vaccinations of all kinds—is explored by Gidengil et al. (2019) in a 
systematic review of studies that used open-ended questioning methods to discover “beliefs 
around childhood vaccination.” When people talk to researchers about vaccination, they do 
externalize worry that vaccination may have adverse effects, but also express skepticism about 
the need for vaccination and distrust of the medical establishment. Refusal of or resistance to 
vaccination cannot reasonably be attributed to a specific belief that MMR vaccines cause autism, 
but this oversimplification surfaces constantly in the vaccination controversy. 
What Gidengil et al. (2019) found in their systematic review of unstructured interviews 
and focus groups is even more evident in examination of what people say in their own 
conversations online. In actual interaction, people externalize all of the classes of beliefs 
identified in their review, but they also defend these beliefs with new reasoning, and they also 
regularly construct arguments against how their beliefs are misrepresented by elites.  
Macroscope methods used in the study of argumentative polylogues allow researchers to 
locate and analyze arguments people spontaneously produce to try to convince others to their 
points of view on vaccination, focusing on points of disagreement (rather than isolated beliefs 
identified as obstacles from one point of view). Using Crimson Hexagon, a commercial tool for 
social media analytics, I searched 12 years of social media data for posts on MMR vaccine injury 
(query string: vaccine AND injury AND MMR), finding over 30,000 on various platforms. 
Crimson Hexagon automatically generates an analysis of topical content and the time trends in 
mentions of each topic (“topic waves”), as shown in Figure 1. The tallest topic wave represents 
the most common of the themes identified by the algorithm: “MMR vaccine and autism.” But 
many of the individual posts are repeating the argument that MMR does not cause autism (with 
very few arguing that it does). Mention of a retracted Lancet article by Andrew Wakefield is a 
standard bit of background invoked in criticisms of “anti-vaxxers”; topic waves involving 
Wakefield rise and fall with the same peaks and valleys as the “MMR vaccine and autism” wave. 
 
 
Figure 1. Social media trends in discussion of vaccine injuries; autism remains a common topic 
of discussion, but mostly because of repeated assertions that vaccines do not cause it. 
 
The centrality of evidence to this controversy is very obvious, but it is far more complex 
than is normally supposed. On the scientific side, a vast literature has developed around trying to 
conclusively answer questions about vaccine safety and effectiveness, and regularly, government 
agencies attempt to evaluate the state of this literature and what conclusions can be drawn from it 
(Jackson & Lambert, 2015). Scientific papers and consensus reports are read by ordinary citizens 
and discussed in detail in social media conversations. Andrew Wakefield’s infamous Lancet 
paper remains prominent in the discussion 10 years after its retraction because its shift from 
“evidence” to “non-evidence” of a connection between vaccination and autism so often appears 
(fallaciously) as evidence that autism is unrelated to vaccination. But the most interesting issue 
surrounding evidence in this controversy is the furor over what to make of firsthand 
observational reports of vaccine injuries—and it is this issue that led to the specific query I 
launched in Crimson Hexagon. 
 Adverse reactions to vaccines are not common, but their infrequent occurrence is openly 
acknowledged by the corporate, institutional, and clinical players involved in the controversy. 
Some of these adverse reactions are noted in experimental trials conducted prior to clinical use of 
a drug, and others are gleaned from post-approval surveillance systems such as the Vaccine 
Adverse Events Reporting System (VAERS). That vaccines will cause injury in a small 
percentage of administrations is known, acknowledged, and uncontested. 
 Firsthand observational reports of children harmed by MMR vaccination should surprise 
no one who is aware (as all medical professionals must be) that any vaccine may cause injury in 
a small percentage of cases. And yet, these reports have been given less and less credence over 
time, to the great wrath of those who had their children vaccinated and were the only firsthand 
witnesses to their children’s reactions. From the medical establishment, the parents of children 
who (may) have been injured by vaccines regularly report that their observations are dismissed 
and discounted; for example, they may be assured that something bad that happened at about the 
same time as the vaccination was just coincidence, not an effect of the vaccination. 
This is an argumentative dead-end from which no movement toward disagreement 
resolution can be expected. A parent who has witnessed firsthand a child’s reaction to a shot 
cannot be talked out of this by being told that whatever happened to their child was 
coincidentally related to the shot. One of the 30,000 tweets retrieved in the Crimson Hexagon 
search put this well: “Everyone is pro-vaccination - until a flu shot paralyzes their friend or the 
MMR injures their child or the DTaP kills their granddaughter. Vaxxers are converted to 
antivaxxers not by Jenny McCarthy or Andrew Wakefield but by the horror of vaccine injury and 
death.”  
Social media are not to blame for people’s beliefs about vaccination injury, but they do 
provide a very convenient place for noninstitutional players in any controversy to get themselves 
organized. Parents who have witnessed their children’s adverse reactions to vaccines can share 
reports on a variety of platforms, and they soon learn that the dismissive reactions they receive 
from medical professionals are a standard reaction that amounts to denial that vaccinations ever 
cause injury. A cross-platform hashtag (#believemothers) has emerged in the past few years as a 
means of aggregating the experiences of parents who find themselves in this situation. 
 At the present state of this controversy, claiming to have witnessed vaccine injury draws 
ridicule, anger, and jeers—and yet it is important for all of us to know if there is some pattern of 
adverse events. Parental reports of adverse events following administration of a vaccine are 
regularly described as “anecdotal,” meaning that they do not count as scientific evidence of a 
general pattern, and lately they have been treated as “misinformation” spread on social media. 
But individually and collectively, they do count as evidence of something (not non-evidence of 
anything). Escaping the dead-end that has been reached along this path will require a 
breakthrough of some kind. For example, some progress might be made if doctors were to 
respond to such occurrences by entertaining the possibility that any one might be “one of those 
rare cases” and working with the parent to document the case for VAERS. In a polylogue, what 
happens at this most local level of interaction seeps out into all other places where people discuss 
vaccination; finding a way to see what these reports are evidence for is much more promising 
than continuing to insist that they are not evidence of anything.  
 
3. AIDS drug trial protests  
 
In the frantic early days of searching for drugs to prevent or cure AIDS, a movement formed 
within the patient population (people with HIV or AIDS) to demand change in the conduct of 
experiments designed to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of proposed treatments. Initially 
resisted by the research community, this movement became an exemplar for effective advocacy 
by those most affected by a disease. This controversy has the nature of expertise as an explicit 
theme. Activists repeatedly insisted “we are the experts,” explicitly called out “expertism,” and 
dared to challenge experts within the experts’ own domain. Through sheer argumentative 
prowess, they showed that they could not be forced into deference.  
 A prolonged disagreement over evidence pitted AIDS activists against the medical 
research “establishment.” As a point of entry to analysis, I have selected one historically 
significant document, a manifesto delivered to the Fifth International Conference on AIDS, held 
in Montreal in June 1989 (digitized copy at https://www.poz.com/pdfs/national-aids-treatment-
research-agenda-1989.pdf). Titled “A National AIDS Treatment Research Agenda,” and 
authored by the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACTUP), the document delivered a 
devastating critique of the AIDS drug development process in the US. The document did not and 
does not “stand alone”: Before its delivery to the Montreal AIDS conference, much of the 
content had been worked up in countless earlier meetings between ACTUP and various public 
health officials.  
 In analyzing argumentative polylogues, Aakhus and Lewiński (2017) observe that the 
opposing players in a controversy engage around diverse sites of practical action. In the case of 
AIDS drug discovery, one such site of practical action is a kind of experiment in which patients 
are observed after being given experimental drugs under carefully controlled conditions—an 
arrangement known as a Randomized Clinical Trial, or RCT. The ACTUP document is mostly 
focused on this site (other sites of practical action being clinical care, drug manufacturing, and a 
variety of surrounding planning, funding, and regulatory activities). 
 RCT was (and still is) the core inferential machinery of the scientific community and 
their institutional and industrial partners; its abstract structure is shown diagrammatically in 
Figure 2. To the expert community of medical researchers, RCT is an inference tool or 
“warranting device” applied routinely to generate evidence (Jackson & Schneider, 2018; 
Schneider and Jackson, 2018, 2019). It is often described as the “gold standard” for causal 
inference, the top of the “evidence pyramid.” But in many health controversies, RCT is a black 
box (Jackson, 2008a) as far as the public is concerned: an expert mechanism for generating facts 
that the public is not in a position to question.  
 In this controversy, the black box is opened and subjected to public critique (Brashers & 
Jackson, 1991). Of “12 principles for a new AIDS drug testing system” proposed in the ACTUP 
document, 7 have to do with aspects of this warranting device: with the design and approval of 
protocols, with recruitment of research participants, with what should be allowable as a “control” 
condition in AIDS drug trials, with what to use as an outcome measure, and with what to do with 
evidence gathered under unblinded conditions (those where physician and/or patient know which 
drug they have been given). ACTUP did not object to the use of RCTs to generate evidence of 
drug effectiveness, but argued that modifications in clinical trial design would produce better 
evidence than what was being produced by standard implementations of RCT.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Design of an experiment to generate evidence of drug effectiveness; a “control” used as 
a point of comparison for the “treatment” may be a placebo or an existing alternative to the 
treatment being tested. 
 
Early on, ACTUP had formed a group to study clinical trial design and how it was 
implemented in AIDS research, and through frequent interaction with medical researchers, they 
soon learned how scientists reasoned about design decisions at every step of the process. This 
allowed them to call out and attack specific beliefs held within the research community. For 
example, knowing that many scientists chose treatment vs placebo designs (instead of treatment 
vs treatment designs) for the supposed clarity of comparison they provide, ACTUP pointed out 
that patients enrolled in placebo-controlled experiments were often able to guess that they were 
being given worthless drugs, and those who believed they were being given placebos commonly 
sought drugs from other sources. From the document (with emphasis added): 
 
Placebo-controlled trials do not yield quick, clean data. Participants take drugs off trial, 
obscuring results. Target enrollment is frequently expanded to minimize data 
contamination from those who drop out or take concurrent medication. 
 
And in case this attack on the actual value of the evidence obtained from these “contaminated” 
trials was unconvincing, ACTUP pointed out that AIDS patient have the power to kill a trial 
outright by refusing to enroll: 
 
No potential trial subject with even a vestigial instinct for self-preservation will join a 
placebo-controlled trial. If a standard treatment exists, new treatments can be compared 
to that. If no approved treatment exists, new treatments can be tested against each other. 
 
Finally, ACTUP pointed out that treatment vs treatment comparisons were nearly always 
possible, and that they provided equal clarity of evidence to support real-world treatment 
decisions. Subsequently, “usual care” (not placebo) has become the default control condition in 
all medical research (and much social science research involving health interventions). 
 With analogous suggestions for patient recruitment and for alternative outcome measures, 
ACTUP advocated trials “designed for the real world,” in language that has since become part of 
the case for much broader use of pragmatic trials (Schneider & Jackson, 2019). ACTUP also 
challenged the restrictiveness of the questions being asked by the scientific community (the 
nearly exclusive focus on the search for antiviral drugs, to the neglect of drugs suitable for 
treating the many “opportunistic infections” afflicting people with AIDS). Strictly speaking, 
these are not challenges to the quality of evidence being generated, but to the choice of what 
evidence to generate. 
 As recalled by Peter Staley in a June 2014 blog post (https://www.poz.com/blog/1989-
act-up-aids-treatment-research-agenda), activists “pushed their way into the conference” and 
“wowed the researchers in attendance.” 25 years after that event, he reflects “We had not only 
demanded a seat at the table, we had earned it.” This is the single most important element of the 
manifesto: insistence that every action affecting people living with AIDS or HIV should involve 
them as equal partners in decision-making—from writing rules for drug approval all the way to 
approving research protocols and to the eventual decision about approving a particular drug for 
use in clinical care. ACTUP argued that this is not just a matter of fairness but a correction of 
research practices that were failing to produce usable evidence of drug effectiveness.  
 
4: Sex education and the politicization of science  
 
A long-lasting controversy in the US centers on what teenagers should be taught about sex. 
Specific positions within this controversy have evolved greatly over a period of several decades. 
For some time the controversy focused on whether sex education should be taught as health 
instruction or as moral instruction: Should teenagers be taught how to avoid sexually transmitted 
diseases and unwanted pregnancies, or should they be taught that these consequences are the cost 
of immorality, avoidable through abstinence from sex outside of marriage? Over several decades, 
new players joined with concerns about whether sex education of both types implied that 
heterosexuality is normal and other sexual orientations abnormal. With rising public concern 
over newly-acknowledged sexual misconduct (the coercive kind, not the “outside of marriage” 
kind), the controversy now seems to be reorganizing around a new take on whether sex education 
should involve moral instruction. 
 The complexity of argumentative polylogues is on full display in this controversy, with 
continual redefinition of the central disagreement as new issues open around the concerns of 
newly-engaged players. Although this controversy is by no means settled, one of its most 
interesting moments occurred during the presidency of George W. Bush. The Bush 
administration used control over federal research and education spending to promote sex 
education aimed at promotion of sexual abstinence, to the exclusion of content relevant to public 
health goals like controlling sexually transmitted diseases. The characterization of this as a 
“politicization of science” linked this controversy to several otherwise unrelated controversies.  
 In an earlier analysis (Jackson, 2008b), I examined a sequence of texts bearing on this 
controversy: a statement issued by the Union of Concerned Scientists charging the Bush 
Administration with distorting scientific work to align it with political ends; a statement 
responding to this charge, presented to the US Congress by John H. Marburger III (chief science 
advisor to President Bush); and a UCS rebuttal to Marburger’s response. In brief, the UCS 
objected to the Bush administration’s restriction of federal spending on sex education to 
“abstinence-only” curricula, when rigorous experimental research had repeatedly shown that 
such programs were ineffective in preventing STDs and unwanted pregnancies. The UCS 
charged that the Bush administration was undermining science by refusing to allow schools to 
use curricula that had been proven effective in achieving these goals. Marburger responded that, 
contrary to what UCS charged, the Bush administration was actively seeking science-based 
programs, but that it was funding the search for programs effective in promoting abstinence.  
  
 
Figure 3. An experiment designed to evaluate the comparative effectiveness of two alternative 
approaches to school sex education; outcome measures are typically linked to measurable public 
health objectives that would be achieved (in theory) if either approach were effective. 
 
 
Research on the effectiveness of sex education curricula uses methods similar to RCTs, 
with the important difference that randomization at an individual level is rarely possible. At best, 
different schools, or different classes within schools, can be randomly assigned to treatments, but 
even this is not always feasible. (This is a well-known threat to validity afflicting much 
educational research, but it will not concern us here.) Figure 3 shows a rather typical design, in 
which the dependent measures include both conventional measures of learning and health-related 
outcomes like reported STDs and reported pregnancies at some time delay from the end of the 
instructional program. Self-report measures related to abstinence are also sometimes included 
(e.g., questionnaire items about age of first sexual intercourse). 
 As in the AIDS drug case, experiments become a significant site of practical action, again 
involving disagreement on the outcomes used to define success and the “treatments” to be 
compared. Marburger’s response to the UCS calls into question the choices the scientific 
community has made about these key features of sex education research. First, his argument 
treats sexual abstinence not as a means to control disease and pregnancy, but as the objective (or 
an objective) of sex education, while the research community tended to evaluate even 
abstinence-promoting curriculum as a means to other ends. While scientists are certainly best 
positioned to generate evidence of effectiveness, given a desired outcome, Marburger’s point 
was that the decision about what goals to pursue does not belong to science. From this point of 
view, the Bush administration simply set out a goal (to teach moral principles in sexual behavior) 
and allocated funding for scientific work on how to achieve it.  
 Second, Marburger strongly implied that the lack of successful abstinence-only curricula 
(even measured against public health goals) reflected a lack of serious effort by researchers to 
create curricula aimed at promoting abstinence. In educational research, where alternative 
curricula are treatments, the team conducting the research must find or devise the materials that 
instantiate a type of curriculum (e.g., “abstinence-only,” “comprehensive,” “sexual risk 
avoidance,” etc.). In principle, the team should create the best instantiation they can for each of 
the contrasting types, but in practice, a team might or might not give equal creative effort to both 
instantiations. Is it possible that research teams fail to come up with effective strategies precisely 
because they do not believe in the possibility of persuading teenagers to abstain from sex? At the 
time of Marburger’s statement, there was nothing really unreasonable in the suspicion that 
ineffective abstinence-only programs were products of self-fulfilling prophecy. Had Marburger 
been steeped in argumentation theory, he might have simply said that the scientific consensus 
was based on fallacious ad ignorantium reasoning: assuming that no effective abstinence-
centered program can be found because an unmotivated (and even biased) search had not 
produced one. 
Nor did Marburger concede any ground on public health goals that research had found 
ways to achieve without teaching abstinence. As he pointed out explicitly, public health goals 
would also be achieved if effective abstinence programs could be found. Lost in the USC 
response is the value of finding a single effective abstinence program; the Bush administration 
was not concerned with showing that abstinence programs as a class are effective, but only with 
finding one approach that actually works well.  
 In short, Marburger defended the Bush administration as fully committed to science-
based policy, but as exercising its rightful authority over setting goals for socially significant 
scientific research. Scientists control the resources necessary to generate scientific evidence, but 
if they also substitute their own goals for what most of the public wants to accomplish, they 
themselves become political actors. The Bush administration readily granted that educational 
programs should have scientific evidence of effectiveness, but insisted that the broader society 
must have a voice in defining the effects to be achieved. To this day, though, I know of no 
program of abstinence-only sex education that has actually succeeded in getting teenagers to 
abstain. 
 
5. Valuing disagreements over evidence 
 
One regular feature of health controversies is that heterogeneous classes of participants tend to 
treat their own special forms of evidence as having privileged status. Often, opposing groups 
argue explicitly about what others’ reasoning methods miss. So it is hardly surprising that in each 
of the three health controversies reviewed here, disagreements over evidence figure centrally.  
In the vaccination controversy, the wave of anger over treating parent reports of vaccine 
injury as non-evidence is a reminder that in health controversies, evidence produced by experts is 
weighed by other players against forms of evidence that experts themselves cannot produce. 
From the controversy over AIDS drug research, we learn that experts are not uniquely 
positioned to judge even their own expert forms of evidence and reasoning. Non-experts who 
know something is not right can, with effort, persuade experts that their assumptions about 
evidence have been wrong, even while granting that they themselves were not in a position to 
take over the work of the experts. This latter point is important, because it has often been 
suggested that AIDS activists became experts; but they became interactional experts, not 
contributing experts, to borrow an important distinction from Collins & Evans, 2007).  
From the controversy over sex education, we learn that political actors can enforce a 
public role in decisions about what kinds of scientific evidence are useful in achieving policy 
goals, but they still cannot force facts to conform with their desires.  
In what sense is public pushback positive in any of these cases? In the case of AIDS drug 
research, pushback from the patient community led to reform of clinical trial design that nearly 
everyone now recognizes as improvement. In the case of vaccine injuries, the judgment most 
commonly expressed is that reports of vaccine injuries are a dangerous form of misinformation; 
but as I have suggested, this is very problematic, and it offers no plausible path out of continued 
controversy. In the case of abstinence-only sex education, there were certainly better ways for 
the government to incentivize the search for new ideas, and there were also much better ways for 
the scientific community to respond; but one clear positive is the reminder that scientific 
communities should not use their control of the fact-finding apparatus to limit which of an array 
of policy options are given fair consideration.  
Pushing back against expert conclusions and even against the inference devices that lead 
to these conclusions can have positive effects on the discourse as a whole. Even in the most 
dispiriting of the cases considered here (the vaccine injury case), those pushing back are looking 
to science and other forms of expertise for answers—clearly acknowledging society’s 
dependence on expertise, even when experts seem intent on silencing them. And if we entertain 
even the slightest possibility that the medical establishment is missing a significant pattern in 
reports of vaccine injury, then the current trend toward treating them as non-evidence (as really 
NOTHING worth investigating) is badly in need of course correction. 
 
6. Closing thoughts 
 
The 2020 coronavirus pandemic has brought unprecedented journalistic attention to society’s 
dependence on experts’ work products.  The world’s struggle to control the pandemic has 
massively elevated the visibility of the science that provides evidence for the spread of the 
disease and for choice of methods to manage it. In the US, daily drama surrounds President 
Trump’s extraordinarily fickle attitude toward the experts on whom he (and all of us) depend, 
generating masses of opinion journalism that directly addresses the importance of letting experts 
speak their truth. 
 The topic of this talk was chosen long before these events began to unfold, and my 
conclusions turn out to be awkwardly timed. One practical implication of what I have to say is 
that a certain amount of public push-back against expert communities is a healthy part of 
deliberative discourse, not a sign of derangement. Expert communities that cannot be questioned 
from the outside are in fact very dangerous. And expert communities are strengthened, not 
undermined, by public efforts to engage with them over evidence. But I cannot make this 
moderate point at this immoderate moment without also saying that broad, sustained attacks on 
the overall trustworthiness of science are neither healthy nor helpful. There is particular danger 
when someone who has no expertise tries push aside experts, or allow them in only when 
convenient. 
Pushing back is different from pushing aside, and the events of the past months have 
helped me to see this difference far more clearly. However, it is still too early (at least for me) to 
write about that, but I have been gathering data for future analysis. 
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